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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN QUAS, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 890601-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Quas requests rehearing of his case. See Brown v. 
Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886)(explaining circumstances allowing 
rehearing) ; Cummincrs v. Nielsonf 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913) (same) . 
A copy of this Court's opinion is in Appendix 1. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD REWRITE THE BRICKEY ISSUE 
IN A MANNER THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE BRICKEY DECISION 
AND THE RECORD IN THIS CASE. 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD OMIT THE DISCUSSION OF "GOOD CAUSE" FOR 
REFILING CASES. 
Quas is consistent with Brickey in limiting the 
circumstances in which a prosecutor may refile a case to two 
circumstances: 1) when the prosecutor presents new or previously 
unavailable evidence, and 2) when the prosecutor presents other good 
cause. Quas at 3. 
The error in the Quas decision lies in the interpretation 
of the "good cause" limitation. In Quas, this court concluded that 
if a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the evidence necessary to 
sustain a finding of probable cause, the prosecutor has "good cause" 
to refile the case after additional investigation. Under the Quas 
"good cause" analysis, a prosecutor could base a successive 
preliminary hearing on evidence that was readily available at the 
previous preliminary hearing(s) as long as he asserts good faith in 
doing so ("the ensuing investigation was not performed to 
procrastinate, harass, or shop for a more favorable magistrate"). 
Quas at 3. This interpretation of the "good cause" limitation thus 
eviscerates the "new or previously unavailable evidence" limitation 
and relies on the good faith of the prosecutor in claiming a 
mistaken assessment of the evidence necessary to support a finding 
of probable cause. 
The Brickey court set forth the "new or previously 
unavailable evidence" limit for a reason—"[T]he prosecutor's good 
faith is a fragile protection for the accused." State v. Brickey, 
714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986). 
The Quas "good cause" for refiling standard is adopted from 
the standard for establishing "good cause" to continue the 
preliminary hearing. Quas at 3 n.l. It is true that "Brickey does 
not distinguish between a continuance of a preliminary hearing and a 
refiling." Id. Lack of explicit distinction, however, does not 
blur the standards that apply to distinct remedies. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized three remedies for a 
prosecutor facing a dismissal of an information: 1) continue the 
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case and obtain the necessary evidence; 2) appeal the magistrate's 
dismissal of the case; or 3) refile the case if there is new or 
previously unavailable evidence or other good cause to justify the 
refiling.1 These remedies are adequate for the prosecution and must 
be interpreted strictly to insure that prosecutors provide 
constitutionally adequate preliminary hearings. See State v. 
Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 783-784 (Utah 1980)(decided under Article I 
section 12 of the Utah Constitution; recognizing that preliminary 
hearings in Utah facilitate the right to a fair trial by giving 
criminal defendants notice and discovery of the Stated case); 
State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986)(decided under 
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution; recognizing that 
preliminary hearings in Utah are designed to protect the accused 
from groundless prosecutions, to conserve judicial resources, and to 
promote confidence in the system of justice). 
If a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the quantum of 
evidence necessary to sustain a finding of probable cause, the 
1. The Brickey court's footnote 5, found at pages 647 and 
648 of Brickev states, 
In Harper v. District Court. Okla., 484 P.2d 
891 (1971), the Oklahoma court clarified Jones, 
holding that good cause to continue a preliminary 
hearing for further investigation might exist 
when a prosecutor innocently miscalculates the 
quantum of evidence required to obtain a bindover 
and further investigation clearly would not be 
dilatory. 484 P.2d 897. In addition, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court has added a new Rule 6 to 
the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals, 
permitting the state to appeal from an adverse 
ruling at a preliminary hearing. See State ex 
rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 498 P.2d 426, 428-429. 
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magistrate should allow a reasonable continuance for the collection 
of evidence that is reasonably available, and which continuance 
would not cause undue delay. Since the prosecutor has the 
continuance remedy, however, it is not appropriate for a prosecutor 
to allow a case to be dismissed, and later refile the case, claiming 
an innocent miscalculation of the evidence. Rather, to refile the 
case, the prosecutor must present new or previously unavailable 
evidence, or other good cause to justify the refiling. Brickey. 
On rehearing, this Court should omit the discussion 
blurring "good cause" for refiling and "good cause" for a 
continuance. Under Ouas, a prosecutor has "good cause" to continue 
or to refile a case if he innocently miscalculates the evidence. 
Quas at 3. This case does not involve the prosecutor's innocent 
miscalculation of the evidence. Rather, the magistrate's dismissal 
of the case after the first preliminary hearing and continuance 
resulted from the prosecutor's failure to present the gunshot 
residue (GSR) tests, despite the magistrate's repeated requests for 
that evidence which was in the prosecutor's possession. See e.g. 
P.H.I 111-121, 167-169; T. 814 at 2-5. Because this case does not 
involve an innocent miscalculation of the evidence or any other good 
cause for refiling the information, the "good cause" discussion is 
neither pertinent nor necessary to the Ouas opinion. 
B. THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY BRICKEY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECORD IN 
THIS CASE. 
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Quas correctly notes that at the successive preliminary 
hearing in this case, "the State presented twelve new exhibits and 
five new witnesses," and the magistrate found that the evidence 
presented at the successive preliminary hearing "had not been 
available at the first hearing, or at least had been 'unavailable as 
set forth in State v. Brickey.'" Quas at 4. 
Unfortunately, Quas does not address the key legal issue in 
dispute before the magistrate, before the trial court, and presented 
on appeal: Was the magistrate legally correct in adopting the 
State's position that "new or previously unavailable evidence" means 
evidence that was readily available to the State in previous 
preliminary hearings (P.H.2 151-152)? As the magistrate stated in 
pondering the question, 
I don't have any question that I've heard a 
great deal of additional new evidence today, but 
I suppose that the argument that's going to be 
made, and I don't want to make your argument for 
you, Miss Remal and Miss Johnson, is that this 
was clearly available evidence at the time of the 
original preliminary hearing. Isn't that really 
the crux of the problem before the Court? 
(P.H.2 138). See also opening brief of Appellant at 17-21 
(discussing the legal meaning of "new or previously unavailable 
evidence"); brief of Appellee at 14-16 (same); reply brief of 
Appellant at 5-8 (same). 
Quas accepts without scrutiny the magistrate's finding that 
evidence at the second preliminary hearing was "new or previously 
unavailable" on the basis that counsel for Mr. Quas failed to 
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marshal the evidence. Id. at 5. 
Counsel for Mr. Quas did marshal the evidence. After 
extensive argument on the legal question of the meaning of "new or 
previously unavailable evidence," counsel for Mr. Quas marshalled 
the only evidence that met that standard—the testimony of Kristine 
Knudson. See opening brief of Appellant at 23-24, included in 
Appendix 2 to this petition. Counsel argued that the testimony of 
Kristine Knudson was not adequate to reverse the magistrate's 
previous dismissal of the information. See id. Counsel argued that 
the reversal was actually improperly based on the presentation of 
the pivotal gunshot residue evidence that was available and 
requested by the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing and at 
the continuance of the first preliminary hearing.2 See id. at pages 
22-24. Additionally, counsel for Mr. Quas addended a copy of the 
prosecution's marshalling of the evidence contained in the State's 
memorandum seeking to refile the case. See id. at page 23 n.22; 
opening brief of appellant, Appendix 2. 
If the foregoing does not constitute "marshalling of the 
2. This Court indicates in addition to the testimony of 
Kristine Knudson concerning conversations with Mr. Quas after the 
first preliminary hearing, the testimony of James Gaskill on the 
gunshot residue (GSR) tests "most clearly met the Brickev standard" 
because the tests were performed after the first preliminary 
hearing, id. at 4. 
The prosecutor admitted at the second preliminary hearing 
that Mr. Gaskill could have done the tests before the first 
preliminary hearing (P.H.2 at 137). 
The State already had performed GSR tests through a 
different expert at the first preliminary hearing but declined to 
present the evidence when requested to do so by the magistrate 
(T. 814 at 2-5). 
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evidence," this Court should explain what is required in order to 
obtain appellate review of issues requiring marshalling of the 
evidence. 
On rehearing, this Court should first address whether the 
magistrate was correct in interpreting "new or previously 
unavailable evidence" as meaning evidence that was reasonably 
available at previous preliminary hearing(s). 
In the event that this Court finds that the magistrate's 
interpretation of the "new or previously unavailable evidence" was 
legally incorrect, this Court should reassess whether the State 
presented sufficient evidence meeting the Brickey standard to 
justify the reversal of the magistrate's initial dismissal of the 
information. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647-648. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE PLAIN ERROR ANALYSIS. 
Quas correctly states the plain error test: 
First, the error must be "plain," that is, "it 
should have been obvious to a trial court that it 
was committing error." Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 
35. Second, the error must affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, that is, the 
error must be harmful. 
Quas at 5-6. 
The application of the test in Quas needs clarification. 
On page 7, the court states, 
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Third, even if the remark were prejudicial, it 
was not sufficiently obvious to invoke the plain 
error exception, especially in light of the 
corroborating evidence offered by this and other 
witnesses, 
(emphasis added). 
This conclusion mixes the two prongs of the plain error 
test. The plainness prong is to be determined by looking at the 
plainness of the legal impropriety of the ruling at issue in light 
of the legal context prevailing when the error was made, not by 
looking at other evidence supporting the verdict. The harmfulness, 
or prejudice prong is to be determined by looking at the impact of 
the improper ruling in light of other evidence. State v. Eldredge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.9 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989). 
The portion of Quas discussing prejudice, quoted above, 
needs additional clarification. If this Court is satisfied with the 
"corroborating evidence offered by this and other witnesses," then 
Dr. Grey's testimony was not prejudicial. But cf. Quas ("Even if 
the remark were prejudicial . . . in light of the corroborating 
evidence."). 
The Quas opinion apparently concludes that the testimony of 
Dr. Grey and Mr. Marchant concerning whether Mrs. Quas7 death fit 
the behavioral norms of suicide victims was not plain error because 
it was not sufficiently harmful, in light of other corroborating 
evidence. Id. at 7 and nn. 3 and 4. 
Mr. Quas respectfully requests that this Court specify on 
which corroborating evidence the Court relies in reaching this 
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conclusion. Particularly since this Court declined to publish its 
analysis of numerous evidentiary questions raised in the trial court 
and briefed on appeal, Quas at 7, it is essential for purposes of 
further review of this Court's decision for this Court to show the 
specific evidentiary basis of this Court's ruling on the plain error 
question. 
III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD OMIT FOOTNOTE 5, 
WHICH CONDITIONS THE APPEALABILITY OF ISSUES 
ON THE CONTENT OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL 
AND DOCKETING STATEMENT. 
In footnote 5, on pages 7 and 8, this Court indicates as 
follows: 
In his brief, appellant asks us to consider 
issues surrounding the court's interlocutory 
order to bind him over for trial. These issues 
include whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's 
decision to bind over, and whether his failure to 
appeal the bindover was timely. We decline to 
consider these issues because they were not 
raised in appellant's docketing statement. Also, 
the docketing statement and the notice of appeal 
indicate that this is an appeal from a final 
order of conviction. Finally, we have already 
disposed of the jurisdictional issue in State v. 
Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah App.), cert. 
granted, 150 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1990). 
(emphasis added). 
On rehearing, this Court should omit this footnote. There 
is neither precedent for nor logic in conditioning the appealability 
of issues on the content of the docketing statement and notice of 
appeal. 
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The rules governing docketing statements and notices of 
appeal have never before been interpreted as requiring parties to be 
familiar with and specify all conceivable issues. Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9 (docketing statement), Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 3 (notice of appeal). 
Docketing statements are designed for purposes unrelated to 
preservation of issues on appeal. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
9(b)("The docketing statement is not a brief and should not contain 
arguments or procedural motions. It is used by the appellate court 
in assigning cases to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals 
when both have jurisdiction, in making certifications to the Supreme 
Court, in classifying cases for determining the priority to be 
accorded them, in making summary dispositions when appropriate, and 
in making calendar assignments."). Notices of appeal are designed 
for a purpose unrelated to the preservation of issues on appeal. 
Nunlev v. Stan Katz Real Estate, 388 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 
1964)("[T]he object of a notice of appeal is to advise the opposite 
party that an appeal has been taken from a specific judgment in a 
particular case."). 
Given that appeals are frequently brought by appellate 
counsel who did not participate in the trial, requiring appellate 
counsel to be familiar with and specify all conceivable issues in 
the notice of appeal and docketing statement sets forth an 
impossible burden, especially since transcripts frequently are not 
prepared before the notice of appeal and docketing statement must be 
filed. See, e.g., State v. Rodney W. Smith. Case No. 900214-CA; 
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State v, Johnny Medina Duran, Case No. 900022-CA. Conditioning the 
appealability of issues on the content of the docketing statement 
and notice of appeal would violate the Utah constitutional right to 
appeal. Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12; Article VIII 
section 5. 
Inasmuch as the issues that this Court declined to address 
in footnote 5 were mooted by the Court's analysis of the merits of 
the bindover issue, footnote 5 is unnecessary. See Burkett v. 
Schwendiman. 773 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah 1989)(mootness doctrine gives 
appellate court discretion to abstain from deciding issues that will 
not affect the rights of the parties). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Quas requests rehearing of this case. 
DATED this /? day of July, 1991. 
^m i r\ r> 
LISA JVREMAL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CAN'DICE'A. J<6HNSON DICE OHNS
Attorney for Petitioner 
E1IZJHBETH 
Attorjney f Petitioner 
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APPENDIX 1 
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JUN181991 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Q 1/1/1^7^^ 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
John Quas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890601-CA 
F I L E D 
(June 18 , 1991) 
^ M a i y T . N o o n t n 
Clerfcotth* Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Third District, Salt take County 
The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup 
Attorneys: Lisa J. Remal, Candice A. Johnson, and Elizabeth 
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Judith S. H. Atherton, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant, John Quas, appeals his conviction of second 
degree murder, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1990), a first degree felony. 
FACTS 
We recite the facts from the record i 
favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
1135, 1137 (Utah 1989). On the evening of 
appellant John Quas and his wife Susan Qua 
had been drinking. The two began to argue 
divorce. Sometime that evening appellant 
Quas. At 9:41 p.m. appellant called the S 
operator to report that his wife had shot 
officer and paramedics arrived within four 
appellant's call. Mrs. Quas was found dea 
n the light most 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 
June 15, 1987 
s were at home. Both 
and to discuss 
shot and killed Mrs. 
alt Lake County 911 
herself. A police 
minutes of 
d, lying on some 
sheets in the living room with a gunshot wound in her left 
eye. Appellant said he had been in the shower, heard a 
gunshot, and came out to find his wife lying on the floor. 
On June 16, 1987, appellant was charged with second degree 
murder. Those charges were dismissed for insufficient evidence 
after a preliminary hearing in the third circuit court to 
determine whether he should be bound over to stand trial. A 
year later, on July 5, 1988, the information was refiled based 
on new or previously unavailable evidence. A second 
preliminary hearing was held before the same circuit court 
judge. On October 24, 1988, the court found that refiling was 
appropriate based on new or previously unavailable evidence and 
that, coupled with the evidence presented at the former 
hearing, the court had probable cause to bind appellant over to 
stand trial as charged. 
Appellant filed a motion in the district court to quash 
the bindover order. The State moved to strike appellant's 
motion to quash. The trial court granted the State's motion on 
the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to review the 
sufficiency of evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. 
Appellant petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for permission to 
appeal from the district court's interlocutory order and the 
court denied permission. Appellant was convicted of criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree. He appealed the 
conviction to the Utah Supreme Court, which, pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1990), transferred the appeal to 
this court. 
THE BRICKEY STANDARD 
To consider the issues arising from the second preliminary 
hearing, we first review the standard for refiling previously 
dismissed criminal charges. This standard is found in State v. 
Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986): 
[D]ue process considerations prohibit a 
prosecutor from refiling criminal charges 
earlier dismissed for insufficient 
evidence unless the prosecutor can show 
that new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good 
cause justifies refiling. . . . [W]hen a 
charge is refiled, the prosecutor must, 
whenever possible, refile the charges 
before the same magistrate who does not 
consider the matter de novo, but looks at 
the facts to determine whether the new 
evidence or changed circumstances are 
sufficient to require a re-examination and 
possible reversal of the earlier decision 
dismissing the charges. 
Id. at 647 (citations omitted). The Brickey court elucidated 
the good cause exception, noting with approval that the court 
in Harper v. District Court, 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1971) held that "good cause to continue a preliminary hearing 
for further investigation might exist when a prosecutor 
innocently miscalculates the quantum of evidence required to 
obtain a bindover and further investigation clearly would not 
be dilatory." 714 P.2d at 647-48, n.5 (citing Harper, 484 P.2d 
at 897)-1 
To sum up the law of refiling as articulated in Brickey 
and set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(d)(1) (1982), 
refiling may take place in cases where new or previously 
unavailable evidence has surfaced, or other good cause 
justifies refiling. The good cause may include cases where a 
prosecutor miscalculated the quantum of evidence needed to bind 
over and the ensuing further investigation was not performed to 
procrastinate, harass, or shop for a more favorable 
magistrate. Brickey, 714 P.2d at 647. Finally, where 
possible, the second hearing should not be de novo and should 
1. Harper involved a continuance rather than a dismissal 
followed by a refiling, which is the case here. Brickev does 
not distinguish between a continuance of a preliminary hearing 
and a refiling. And Brickev specifically mentions that a 
finding of good cause can justify the refiling of dismissed 
charges. 714 P.2d at 647. Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-7(d)(1) 
(198-2), as well as its replacement, Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(c), 
each require the magistrate to dismiss the information if 
probable cause is not established. In addition, both versions 
explicitly provide for refiling under appropriate 
circumstances: -The dismissal and discharge do not preclude 
the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense." In any event, the Brickey requirements of 
reviewing the evidence presented at the prior hearing and 
appearing before the same magistrate, where possible, are 
applicable whether the first hearing ended with a dismissal or 
with a continuance. 
be before the same magistrate, who is in the best position to 
"determine whether the new evidence or changed circumstances 
are sufficient to require a re-examination and possible 
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing the charges.w Id. 
NEW OR PREVIOUSLY UNAVAILABLE EVIDENCE 
Appellant urges us to set aside the findings underlying 
the circuit court's conclusion that the evidence presented at 
the second preliminary hearing was new or previously 
unavailable. Because the preliminary hearing was an action 
tried upon the facts without a jury, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
applies. We will therefore not set aside the trial court's 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. To establish clear 
error, the appellant "must marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact and then 
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack." State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 
475-76 (Utah 1990); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 
1988) (findings made upon bench trial will be sustained unless 
they are against the clear weight of the evidence). A finding 
is clearly erroneous "when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.- State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948)). 
At the second preliminary hearing, the State presented 
twelve new exhibits and five new witnesess. Of this evidence, 
the testimony of James Gaskill from the Weber State Crime Lab 
and Kristine Knudson, appellant's former girlfriend, most 
clearly met the Brickev standard because each testified about 
tests or conversations occurring after the first preliminary 
hearing. Gaskill testified about gunshot residue (GSR) tests 
and Knudson testified to three conversations with appellant. 
After the second preliminary hearing, the magistrate found that 
the State had accumulated new evidence, and that such evidence 
had not been available at the first hearing, or at least had 
been "unavailable as set forth in State v. Brickev." 
2. "The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals govern 
criminal appeals to the appellate court, except as otherwise 
provided." Utah R. Crim. P. 26{7). 
In challenging this finding, appellant has not marshaled 
the evidence in support of the pertinent findings, nor has he 
demonstrated that the marshaled evidence, including all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support them. We therefore accept the court's finding that 
evidence presented at the second preliminary hearing was new or 
unavailable. 
We next consider the issue of whether the Brickev standard 
was met. Given the court's findings, this issue presents a 
conclusion of law to which we accord no deference and which we 
review for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497 
(Utah App. 1990), cert, granted, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990). 
Because the court correctly found that the evidence 
presented was new or%unavailable, and because the second 
preliminary hearing was in the same forum and before the same 
magistrate as was the first preliminary hearing, and because 
the magistrate considered the record of the prior hearing along 
with the evidence presented at the second hearing, we see no 
error in the court's conclusion that the Brickev standard was 
met and that refiling was appropriate. 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Having found that the bindover was proper, we now consider 
the other issues pertaining to the trial. Appellant argues 
that the testimony of Dr. Todd Grey, the medical examiner, and 
that of Brent Marchant of the State Medical Examiner's Office, 
to the effect that the nature of the victim's wounds was more 
consistent with homicide than with suicide, violated Utah R. 
Evid. 403, 404 and 702. 
Because no contemporaneous objections to this testimony 
were made, appellant has waived his right to raise the matter 
on appeal, State v, Eldredoe, 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989), unless the 
testimony comes within the plain error analysis. I£.; State v. 
Braun, 787 P.2d 1336, 1341-42 (Utah App. 1990). 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) provides w[n]othing in this rule 
precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court." The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting this rule, has 
established a two-part test to determine plain error. First, 
the error must be "plain," that is, "it should have been 
obvious to a trial court that it%was committing error." 
Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35. Second, the error must affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, that is, the error must be 
harmful. 1&. The policy behind the plain error test is to 
allow the court to reach justice in a given case. 1£. at 35 
n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342. See Utah R. Evid. 102. 
The transcript reveals that Dr. Grey did not give 
psychological profile testimony, condemned in State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1989), nor did he vouch for 
the truthfulness of a witness's testimony based on anecdotal 
-statistical- evidence, condemned in State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498, 501 (Utah 1986) and also in State v. Ioro, 801 P.2d 938, 
941 (Utah App. 1990). 
Instead, Dr. Grey^addressed the issue of whether the 
victim died via suicide or homicide by examining the physical 
evidence of the victim's body and by demonstrating the 
hypothesis of suicide using a live model whose arm length was 
identical to that of the victim. He had the model hold the gun 
in various positions to see whether it was possible for Mrs. 
Quas to shoot herself with the muzzle sixteen to eighteen 
inches away from the entry wound and with the gun oriented so 
that the bullet path would correspond to that of the victim. 
He had the model hold the gun with either hand, with both 
hands, and in a position so she could fire using her thumb. He 
also had the model hold the gun in these various positions with 
her arms extended as far as possible. He found that the gun 
could be held in the right hand at fourteen or fifteen inches 
away, in the left hand at fourteen inches away, or in both 
hands at twelve and a half or thirteen inches away. He 
concluded that, while it may have been technically possible for 
Mrs. Quas to shoot herself, 
it's a very cumbersome and in my 
experience completely atypical way for 
somebody to commit suicide. When people 
shoot themselves, they usually put the gun 
where they want the bullet to go and pull 
the trigger. I've never seen a clearly 
proven suicide where the person has held 
the gun as far as away from their body as 
they possibly can before shooting. 
Here, the gist of the testimony goes to the fact that, if 
the victim had committed suicide, she chose a physically 
awkward and hence unlikely method to carry out the deed. 
Both Rammel and Ioro condemn the use of evidence 
"concerning matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis 
such as witness veracity,H because such evidence leads to undue 
prejudice. Iorg, 801 P.2d at 941-42. However, Rammel and Ioro 
do not apply in this case. First, Dr. Grey's testimony was not 
offered as statistical evidence that Mrs. Quas did not commit 
suicide. Rather, the testimony was offered to prove that, 
while it was technically possible to achieve suicide given the 
circumstances, it would have been "cumbersome" and "atypical." 
Second, Dr. Grey was not vouching for another witness's 
veracity, nor was he giving statistical probabilities for 
another's veracity. Third, even if the remark were 
prejudicial, it was not sufficiently obvious to invoke the 
plain error exception, especially in light of the corroborating 
evidence offered by this and other witnesses.^ 
Brent Marchant, 3n investigator with the State Medical 
Examiner's Office, did not opine as to whether the death was a 
homicide or suicide. Neither did he testify as to the profile 
of the hypothetical suicide victim. He testified that Mrs. 
Quas's wound was unusual because, from his ten years' 
experience investigating many of the one hundred and fifty 
gunshot suicides that occur in Utah each year, he had seen only 
one suicide gunshot wound inflicted in the eye. That wound was 
a direct contact wound, unlike that of the victim. Therefore, 
even if Marchant's statement were erroneous, it is not 
sufficiently obvious to invoke the plain error exception.4 
As to the other issues appellant raises on appeal, we have 
reviewed them and find them to be without merit. See State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 1989).5 
3. While the requirement of obviousness may be waived in cases 
of "a high degree of harmfulness," we do not find such a degree 
of harmfulness in this case in light of the corroborating 
evidence. Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35 n.8; Braun, 787 P.2d at 1342. 
4. See note 3. 
5. In his brief, appellant asks us to consider issues 
surrounding the court's interlocutory order to bind him over 
for trial. These issues include whether the district court had 
jurisdiction to review the circuit court's decision to bind 
over, and whether his failure to appeal the bindover was 
timely. We decline to consider these issues because they were 
not raised in appellant's docketing statement. Also, the 
CONCLUSION 
We find no error in the court's conclusions that evidence 
presented in the second preliminary hearing included new or 
previously unavailable evidence, that the refiling met the 
Brickey standard, and finally, that the experts' conclusion 
that thegxidence supported a homicide rather than a suicide 
did ne^constitute plain ej=?or. We therefore affirm. 
*&^^^'^2~ 
5«-grTaT^ W. Garff, Judge, 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Iregor^ffl Orme, Judge 
(Footnote 5 continued) 
docketing statement and the notice of appeal indicate that this 
is an appeal from a final order of conviction. Finally, we 
have already disposed of the jurisdictional issue in State v. 
Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 150 
Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (1990). 
APPENDIX 2 
C. THE MAGISTRATE IN THIS CASE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING THE BINDOVER ORDER ON THE BASIS OF 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE SECOND PRELIMINARY HEARING THAT WAS 
READILY AVAILABLE TO THE PROSECUTION AT THE FIRST PRELIMINARY 
HEARING• 
In the instant case, the magistrate indicated prior to 
the second preliminary hearing that she would bind the case over 
if Mr. Matheson would present the gunshot residue test foundation 
and results that Mr. McConkie had previously refused to present 
upon the magistrate's request at the first preliminary hearing 
(T.814 2-5, 7). Given this assurance, the State proceeded to 
present evidence additional to the pivotal gunshot residue tests 
(which were available at the first preliminary hearing), not to 
secure a bindover order, but to insure that Appellant's 
conviction could withstand appellate review (T.814 6-7). See 
Appendix 1. 
It is doubtful that the Brickey court set forth the 
Utah due process standard for refiling dismissed cases with an 
eye to improving the appearance of appellate records. Rather, it 
seems that the court set forth the standard for refiling cases 
to force prosecutors to present their cases forthrightly the 
21 
first time at preliminary hearing. 
dismissal). 
In Utah also, a prosecutor faced with an improper 
dismissal for lack of probable cause can appeal the ruling. Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(3)(a). See also R. 17, where the 
State concedes that extraordinary writs provide the State with 
relief from an improper dismissal. 
21 See Brickey at 714 P.2d at 647 (indicating that 
"fundamental fairness" requires judicial restraint of prosecutors 
in this context, because the good faith of prosecutors is "a 
22 
Given the misapplication of the Brickey standard in 
this case, perhaps this Court should refrain from engaging in 
Brickey analysis altogether. Nonetheless, Appellant provides 
that analysis infra. 
Inasmuch as the magistrate adopted a due process 
standard that permitted refiling of the information because the 
prosecution presented evidence in addition to that presented at 
the first preliminary hearing (P.H.2 152)# the magistrate did not 
make findings indicating whether the State had presented any 
evidence during the second preliminary hearing that was not 
22 
reasonably available at the first preliminary hearing. 
Appellant maintains his position that the only evidence 
presented by the State during the second preliminary hearing that 
might have met the Brickey due process standard was the testimony 
of Kristine Knudson, who testified that after the first 
preliminary hearing, Appellant made statements to her concerning 
23 
the night of Susan's death (P.H.2 73-84). While the magistrate 
fragile protection for the accused."). 
22 A summary of the evidence presented at the first and 
second preliminary hearings was filed by the prosecution, and can 
be found at R. 18-30 and in Appendix 2 to this brief. While the 
summary is not completely accurate, it is adequate to give this 
Court a purview of the evidence presented at the preliminary 
hearings, and to show that, with the exception of the testimony 
of Kristine Knudson, all of the evidence presented at the second 
hearing was reasonably available at the first hearing. 
23 Ms. Knudson indicated, "He said he couldn't tell where 
she had gotten shot, and he said that he picked up her head and 
that there was blood coming out the back of her head. Then he 
said that he put a sheet under her." (P.H.2 75-76). She 
indicated that Appellant also told her that when he heard the 
shot and left the shower, he could tell Susan was already dead, 
23 
did indicate that the statements referred to by Ms. Knudson 
during the second preliminary hearing were "clearly inconsistent" 
with Appellant's statements to the investigating officers (P.H.2 
140), the magistrate did not indicate that this previously 
unavailable evidence was the reason for the bindover order in the 
second case. 
Because the magistrate at the first preliminary hearing 
indicated her disbelief of Appellant's statements to the 
investigating officers (P.H.I 169), it can hardly be assumed that 
this previously unavailable evidence from Ms. Knudson resulted in 
the bindover order. Rather, the bindover order was a result of 
the presentation of the previously available evidence presented 
at the second hearing, the gunshot residue tests. 
But as explained by the Brickey court, it was the 
State's burden to demonstrate with previously unavailable 
24 
evidence that the initial dismissal should not stand. 
Without meeting the Brickey standard (neither for 
purposes of appellate review, nor for purposes of fulfilling the 
and went downstairs to check the wash prior to calling for help 
(P.H.2 77). 
24 The Brickey court explained, 
The Jones court further held that when a 
charge is refiled, the prosecutor must, 
whenever possible, refile the charges before 
the same magistrate who does not consider 
that matter de novo, but looks at the facts 
to determine whether the new evidence or 
changed circumstances are sufficient to 
require a re-examination and possible 
reversal of the earlier decision dismissing 
the charges. I<i. at 171-72. 
714 P.2d at 647. 
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